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The privilege against self-incrimination con-
tained in the fifth amendment of the inited States
Constitution' has proven to be a difficult provision
of the Bill of Rights to interpret.2 The language
used by the framers establishing the privilege is
both ambiguous3 and misleading,4 thereby making
textual analysis unconvincing. Similarly, the his-
torical background and intent of the framers are
unclear,5 features which otherwise would assist in
defining the proper scope of the privilege. Finally,
the policies that the fifth amendment is designed
to further6 are seriously disputed, leaving the priv-
ilege without an agreed upon rationale.
1 The relevant language provides that "no person ...
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
ag inst himself." U.S. CONsr. amend. V.2 See generally Berger, The Unprivileged Status of the Privi-
lege Against Slf-Incrimination, 15 AM. CRIM. L, REv. 191
(1978).
'The greatest ambiguity arises from the compulsion
requirement, a standard which gives no indication as to
how much pressure the fifth amendment is willing to
tolerate. See generally Ritchie, Compulsion That Violates the
Fijfh Amendment: The Burger Court's Definition, 61 MINN. L.
REv. 383 (1977). The "witness" requirement is of a
similar character. While it suggests that compulsion upon
the accused to assist the state at trial is barred, the Court
has instead held that the term only applies to the act of
being a witness in a testimonial or communicative sense.
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Schmerber
v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
4 The "no person" language of the privilege against
self-incrimination gives no indication that persons acting
in a representative capacity in holding documents are
barred from asserting the fifth amendment when served
with a subpoena. The Court, however, has imposed such
a qualification. Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85
(1974).
'The historical development of the right to remain
silent in British common law tradition and American
colonial experience covers many centuries and is simply
too vast to comprehensively assess. Nevertheless, substan-
tial historical treatment of the privilege can be found in
L. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFrHt AMENDMENT (1968); 8 J.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAw § 2250
(McNaughton rev. ed. 1961); Morgan, The Privilege
Against Self-Incmination, 34 MINN. L. REv. 1 (1949); Pitt-
man, The Colonial and Constitutional Histo y of the Privilege
Against Sef-Incrimination in America,'21 VA. L. REV. 763
(1935).
'The dispute over the policies behind the right to
silence has been intense. McNaughton saw the privilege
One particularly troublesome problem which
the Supreme Court has had to face in interpreting
the privilege has been the need to set limits on the
kind and intensity of pressure the state may bring
to bear upon an individual to reveal what the state
wishes to know. At one extreme, pressure in the
form of physical coercion might be exerted by the
state to obtain damaging information from a sus-
pect. The Supreme Court, however, has had little
difficulty classifying physical force as impermissible
compulsion.7 Similarly, the threat of the criminal
contempt sanction has been held to violate the
privilege against self-incrimination.8 Even many
as: 1) protecting the innocent defendant from a bad
performance on the stand; 2) avoiding burdening the
courts with false testimony; 3) encouraging witness testi-
mony by precluding their compulsory incrimination; 4)
a recognition of the practical limits of governmental
power; 5) preventing the use of procedures employed by
such discredited institutions as the Star Chamber; 6)
justified by history; 7) serving to avoid distasteful situa-
tions; 8) spurring the prosecutor to perform a complete
investigation; .9) frustrating "bad laws" which infringe
on political and religious beliefs; 10) deterring "fishing
expedition" prosecutions; I1) preventing torture and in-
humane treatment; and 12) contributing to a fair indi-
vidual-state balance in criminal justice. J. WIGMORE, supra
note 5, § 2251 at 310-18. Jeremy Bentham, in contrast,
criticized the privilege as 1) confusing interrogation with
torture; 2) being linked to institutions such as the Star
Chamber and improperly discarded with those institu-
tions; and 3) simply assumed to be proper, thus discour-
aging criticism. J. BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL
EVIDENCE (182T, 7 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM
446-66 (Bowring ed. 1843) cited in J. WIGMORE, supra note
5, § 2251, at 297 n.2. Most recently, the policy debate
has focused upon the degree to which the fifth amend-
ment protects privacy interests. See, -e.g., Andresen v.
Maryland, 427 U.S. 463,(1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting);
Note, Formalism, Legal Realism and Constitutionally Protected
Pivacy Under the Fourth and Fiflh Amendments, 90 HARv. L.
REv. 945 (1977).
7 In Brain. v. United States, the Court held that "a
confession, in order to be admissible, must be free and
voluntary; that is, must not be extracted by any sort of
threats or violence." 168 U.S. 532, 542-43 (1897). A
similar result was achieved under the due process clause
to control state-criminal practice. Brown v. Mississippi,
297 U.S.-278 (1936).
8 Legal compulsion to incriminate one's self as reflected
in the contempt sanction is one of the historical sources
of the fifth amendment. See Berger, supra note 2, at 193
n.9. The Court's rejection of such compulsion was ex-
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far less coercive tactics have been deemed uncon-
stitutional compulsion, particularly when em-
ployed by law enforcement officers.
9
Despite the Court's unmistakable rejection of
overt coercion to obtain admissions from a sus-
pect,' 0 and its special concern for the quality of the
police interrogation process," the Court has never
intimated that information obtained as a result of
any pressure, however slight, is barred by the priv-
ilege against self-incrimination. To the contrary,
only pressure that amounts to compulsion is pro-
hibited by the fifth amendment language. But,
when the state seeks information and offers the
individual being questioned the choice of providing
it or facing a consequence, it is difficult to deter-
mine whether constitutional bounds have been
exceeded.12 Torture, the threat of being jailed, and
pressed in Murphy v. Waterfront Comm. of N.Y., where
it stated that one of the foundations of the privilege is
"our unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to
the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or con-
tempt." 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964). Testimonial immunity,
however, eliminates the self-incrimination potential, Kas-
tigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972), and contempt
penalties can then be imposed. See Cheff v. Schnacken-
berg, 384 U.S. 373 (1966); Shillitani v. United States,
384 U.S. 364 (1966).
'See e.g., Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801
(1977) (forfeiture of political party positions); Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (police custodial inter-
rogation).
o See notes 7-8 supra.
1 The absence of legal compulsion in the police inter-
rogation process would arguably justify exclusive use of
the due process clause to control police questioning. See
J. WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 2252, at 328-29. The Court's
Miranda decision not only rejected that restrictive view of
the privilege, but also demonstrated a special concern in
the affirmative warning requirements that it has refused
to apply elsewhere. United States v. Mandujano, 425
U.S. 564 (1976) (grand jury). The special concern for
police interrogation is a result of the secrecy of the
process, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 448-50; oppor-
tunities for its abuse, id. at 445, citing NATIONAL COMMS-
SION ON LAw OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT (193 1); and
the inadequacy of case-by-case review, Kamisar, A Dissent
From the Miranda Dissents: Some Comments on the "New" Fifth
Amendment and the Old "Voluntariness" Test, 65 MICH. L.
REv. 59, 102-03 (1966).
' The special problems created when tactics such as
deception or promises of benefits are employed to obtain
information are not treated herein. See generally Dix,
Mistake, Ignorance, Expectation of Benefit, and the Modern Law
of Confessions, 1975 WASH. U.L.Q. 275. The most recent
Supreme Court pronouncement on the subject suggests
that there is a great deal of leeway in the state's choice of
tactics. See Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977);
Berger, supra note 2, at 204-08. It is assumed throughout,
however, that the individual is not being misled in the
choices presented to him.
coercive interrogation techniques may well deprive
an individual of the ability to choose whether or
not to give information; it is not clear that conse-
quences of a lesser magnitude have the same ef-
fect.'
3
Judging how heavily the state may burden the
decision to exercise or forego the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination is a concededly
problematic undertaking. 4 Nevertheless, the for-
mulation of a standard is essential to insure prin-
cipled decisionmaking. Unfortunately, however,
the Supreme Court has thus far avoided the task.
The decisions from the Warren era suggest in very
broad language that any burden on the exercise of
the right to remain silent is forbidden,' 5 while more
recent rulings have barred only those penalties
automatically imposed for assertions of the privi-
lege.' 6 Neither extreme, however, represents a sat-
isfactory resolution of the conflicting interests in-
volved. Rather, as argued below, the fifth amend-
ment should stand as a presumptive barrier against
the imposition of sanctions on those who claim
their right to silence, allowing adverse conse-
quences only when the state is pursuing a substan-
tial state interest which it cannot achieve in alter-
native ways.
THE LIMITS OF THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-
INCRIMINATION
Although the Court has avoided the establish-
ment of standards to assess state imposed burdens
on the fifth amendment, it has elsewhere defined
precise limits to the scope of the privilege against
13 In a sense, choice is always present since the individ-
ual can always remain silent and accept the dire conse-
quence. However, it is apparent that the Court has not
assessed the ability to choose from the perspective of
heroes and martyrs.
" See Dix, Waiver in Criminal Procedure: A Brieffor More
Careful Analysis, 55 Tax. L. REV. 193, 246-51 (1977);
Westen, Away From Waiver: A Rationale for the Forfeiture of
Constitutional Rights in Criminal Procedure, 75 MICH. L. Rav.
1214 (1977):
"sGriffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965), held
unconstitutional prosecutorial comments on a defend-
ant's silence at trial and judicial acquiescence in the
comments as a "penalty imposed by courts for exercising
a constitutional privilege" cutting "down on the privilege
by making its assertion costly." Elsewhere the Court had
expressed its view of the privilege as a right "to remain
silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise
of his own will, and to suffer no penalty . . . for such
silence." Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964).
"6 See e.g., Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976)
(adverse inference from invocation of the privilege against




self-incrimination. In turn, the fifth amendment
only regulates burdens affecting interests that the
privilege protects; claims falling outside the specific
range of the self-incrimination clause must find
protection elsewhere.'
7
The Court has, for example, interpreted the
language of the privilege to exclude its application
to organizations.t s The fifth amendment provides
that "no person" shall be compelled to incriminate
himself, and the Court has chosen a literal con-
struction of that phrase. Not only can organizations
not assert the privilege, but their agents in posses-
sion of materials sought are similarly barred despite
potential personal incrimination.' 9 Most recently,
in denying self-incrimination protection to a three-
man law firm, the Court indicated that the govern-
ing standard is the capacity in which the papers
sought are held rather than the character of the
organization holding them.2° The Court's treat-
ment of assertions of privilege by organizations and
their representatives provides an indication of the
limiting effect that the "no person" qualification
has on the fifth amendment. Organizations are not
the only entities holding papers in a representative
capacity, and when private material is turned over
to another by its owner the self-incrimination pro-
tection need not necessarily follow the documents.
Such is the current view of the Supreme Court:
21
17 The Court, for example, has utilized the due process
clause rather than the fifth amendment to invalidate the
use of pretrial silence, following a Miranda warning, for
impeachment use at trial. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610
(1976). Similarly, the absence of fifth amendment warn-
ing requirements in the grand jury, United States v.
Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564 (1976), has caused resort to the
supervisory power rationale to provide alternative regu-
lation United States v. Jacobs, 547 F.2d 772 (2d Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 937 (1978).
18 See, e.g., McPhaul v. United States, 364 U.S. 372
(1960) (Civil Rights Congress); United States v. White,
322 U.S. 694 (1944) (labor union); Wilson v. United
States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911) (corporation).
"0 McPhaul v. United States, 364 U.S. 372, 380 (1960).
2'Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85 (1974). See
generally 39 ALn. L. Rav. 545 (1975); 3 HoFSrRA L. REv.
467 (1975). If one views the function of the privilege as
narrowly embracing the protection of the "inner sanctum
of individual feeling and thought," 417 U.S. at 91, the
decisions are understandable. The danger lies in the fact,
however, that the smaller the organization the greater
the potential for organization documents to encompass
individual feelings and thoughts. And, there is no guar-
antee that existing doctrine will recognize such distinc-
tions. But see In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 558 F.2d
1299 (8th Cir. 1977).
"' In Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973),.the
Internal Revenue Service directed a summons to the
the 'person' who cannot be compelled to incrimi-
nate himself is the accused; those who hold docu-
ments for him, but who would not be incriminated
by them, cannot assert the privilege.
Rather than protecting the privacy of docu-
ments,s" the Court has construed the privilege
against self-incrimination to prevent obtaining
documents in a prohibited manner from one who
petitioner's accountant directing the production of all
documents relating to the tax liability of the client. Couch
sought to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination
to bar production of the documents by her accountant,
but was unsuccessful. The Court, however, viewed the
privilege as "an intimate and personal one," 409 U.S. at
327, and noted that "possession bears the closest relation-
ship to the personal compulsion forbidden by the Fifth
Amendment." I, at 331. The Court specifically rejected
ownershij of documents as the relevant standard for the
privilege, but did recognize that "situations may well
arise where constructive possession is so clear or the
relinquishment of possession is so temporary and insig-
nificant as to leave the personal compulsion upon the
accused substantially intact." Id. at 333.
In Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976), the
taxpayer, unlike the petitioner in Couch, had retrieved his
tax records from his accountant. But, in order to obtain
legal, advice, the documents were turned over to the
taxpayer's attorney who asserted the self-incrimination
clause in an effort to resist their production in response
to an IRS subpoena. The Supreme Court, in language
much stronger than that used in Couch, rejected this fifth
amendment argument. The Court succinctly concluded
that there was no violation of the fifth amendment in the
production order because its "enforcement against a tax-
payer's lawyer would not 'compel' the taxpayer to do
anything-and certainly would not compel him to be a
'witness' against himself." Id. at 397. Neither the fact that
the taxpayer in Fisher had reasserted control over the
documents nor the differing expectations of privacy and
confidence one might have in turning documents over to
an attorney rather than an accountant (due to the evi-
dentiary privilege applicable to the former) was deemed
sufficient to alter the result. Although Fisher, like Couch,
included the possibility that fifth amendment protection
might be available in situations of constructive possession
or temporary relinquishment, Id at 398, no indication
was given as to what set of facts the Court would deem
sufficient. To the contrary, the Court's decisions seem
more in tune with a rule that "a party incriminated by
evidence produced by a third party sustains no violation
of his own Fifth Amendment rights." California Bankers
Ass'n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21, 55 (1974).
' See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 426-28
(1976) (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment); Com-
ment, A Paper Chase: The Search and Seizure of Personal
Business Records, 43 BIOOLyN L. Rav. 489 (1976); Com-
ment, The Search and Seizure of Pivate Papers; Fourth and
Fifth Amendment Considerations, 6 Loy. L.A.L. Rav. 274
(1973); Comment, Papers, Privacy and the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments: A Constitutional Analysis, 69 Nw. U.L. Rav
626 (1974).
19791
would be incriminated by their production. Thus,
if an item can be obtained through a search and
seizure, there is no compulsion and thus no fifth
amendment violation.23 Similarly, if the act of
production is not incriminatory, the fact that the
contents of the documents sought are incriminatory
provides no basis for invocation of the privilege.24
And finally, even if compulsion directs an incrim-
inatory act by the accused, the privilege can be
circumvented by a grant of testimonial immu-
nity.25
It is important to recognize, however, that the
privilege does not protect against all forms of in-
crimination. The specific language of the privilege
barring compulsion "to be a witness" against one-
self has been limited to evidence that is testimonial
23 In Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976), the
Court upheld the constitutionality of a search warrant
for personal business papers. The Court noted that the
items in question were voluntarily committed to writing,
obtained by the police who conducted the search and
seizure, and authenticated by a handwriting expert. Id
at 473. The only compulsion on Andresen was the inher-
ent pressure to refute unfavorable evidence at trial and
that was not considered to be a fifth amendment viola-
tion. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 83-84 (1970). This
is in accord with Dean Wigmore's view of the privilege
against self-incrimination. J. WIGMORE, supra note 5, §
2264, at 380.
2 In Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976), the
Court permitted enforcement of a subpoena for the pro-
duction of records held by the taxpayer's attorney and
indicated that the records could also have been sub-
poenaed from the taxpayer himself. The Court felt that
such an order directed to the taxpayer "does not compel
oral testimony; nor would it ordinarily compel the tax-
payer to restate, repeat, or affirm the truth of the contents
of the documents sought." Id. at 409. The Court did
concede that response to a documentary subpoena admits
possession of the documents and may provide implicit
authentication. Whether this provides the necessary in-
criminatory potential, however, must be judged on a case
by case basis. Id. at 410-11. See also J. WIGMORE, supra
note 5, § 2264, at 380. But, under the Court's theory, it
would appear that only writings whose possession is
intrinsically incriminating are likely to receive any fifth
amendment protection, and this is certain to constitute
a narrow sphere. Whether the first or fourth amendments
will add anything to the Court's resolution was left
undecided. 425 U.S. at 401 n.7.
25 The Court has held that a grant of testimonial
immunity provides sufficient protection to allow the state
to compel the production of the information it seeks.
Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972). The
immunity, however, must encompass both use and deriv-
ative use of the evidence. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142
U.S. 547 (1892). But, if the same evidence is obtained
from an independent source it may be admitted over
fifth amendment objection. See, e.g., United States v.
Kurzer, 534 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1976).
or communicative in character.26 The Court has
stated that the privilege "offers no protection
against compulsion to submit to fingerprinting,
photographing, or measurements, to write or speak
for identification, to appear in court, to stand, to
assume a stance, to walk, or to make a particular
gesture., 27 Not only is the fifth amendment not a
barrier to all forms of coerced assistance to the
state, but it also makes no distinction between
passive or affirmative aid.2s
The only expansively interpreted provision of
the privilege against self-incrimination has been
the clause limiting its application to "any criminal
case." Literally read, the language suggests that
compulsory self-incrimination is forbidden only at
the criminal trial stage of legal proceedings. Such
a construction, however, would virtually eliminate
the privilege against self-incrimination as a mean-
ingful guarantee. Allowing the state to compel
admissions at one proceeding for later use in a
criminal trial would make the right to silence at
trial an empty formality. The Court has, therefore,
accepted the necessity of permitting assertion of
the privilege in any setting in which self-incrimi-
nation may occur, 2' including the grand jurya a
congressional hearing,
3 ' or a civil proceeding.32
It has also been deemed necessary to extend self-
incrimination protection beyond directly incrimi-
nating evidence to include information forming a
link in the chain to such evidence.33 And, "it need
only be evident from the implications of the ques-
tion, in the setting in which it is asked, that a
responsive answer to the question or an explanation
of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous
because injurious disclosure could result for an
26United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967);
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
' Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 764 (1966).
2 Mr. Justice Fortas sought to distinguish the display
of an individual in a lineup from further volitional acts
that might be required of him. His argument that affirm-
ative aid is barred by the fifth amendment was rejected.
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (Fortas, J.,
dissenting in part).
, The fifth amendment "not only protects the individ-
ual against being involuntarily called as a witness against
himself in a criminal prosecution but also privileges him
not to answer official questions put to him in any other
proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal; where
the answers might incriminate him in future criminal
proceedings." Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973).
o United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564 (1976);
Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
3i Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
32 McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34 (1924).
33 Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 159 (1950).
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assertion of privilege to be valid."5 ' But, failure to
claim the privilege or the provision of partial in-
formation may be deemed a waiver of fifth amend-
ment rights.s
Much of the doctrine that now governs fifth
amendment decisions appears to be a reflection of
the historical origins of the privilege against self-
incriminationse The state is thus barred from tor-
ture and placing suspects in the "cruel trilemma of
self-accusation, perjury or contempt,"' ' but little
more. The Court has also refused to utilize the
privilege to protect broader privacy interests,as and
the narrowed scope of the Court's fifth amendment
decisions is the result. Yet, given all the qualifica-
tions which the Court has imposed upon the priv-
ilege against self-incrimination, one might antici-
pate a clear and consistent policy of protection for
fifth amendment interests when they are validly
claimed. But, as the case law and supporting anal-
ysis indicate, such is not the case. Not only has the
scope of the privilege been narrowed, but the state
has been permitted to coerce individuals into for-
going its exercise, and no persuasive rationale ex-
plains the Court's policy.
REGULATING FIFrH AMENDMENT BURDENS
A. The Absolutist Position
The compulsion requirement of the privilege
against self-incrimination and its interpretation by
' Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486-87
(1951)
-5 Provision of partial information may be deemed a
waiver because of the Court's concern for "distortion of
facts by permitting a witness to select any stopping place
in the testimony." Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367,
371 (1951). As a result, "where criminating facts have
been voluntarily revealed, the privilege cannot be in-
voked to avoid disclosure of the details." Id. at 373. The
Court's waiver analysis has, however, been subject to
criticism. See generally Dix, supra note 14.
Elsewhere, as to witnesses, the Court has held that
testimony in response to official questioning is not com-
pelled self-incrimination. United States v. Kordel, 397
U.S. 1 (1970). Similarly, responses on a tax return are
not compelled self-incrimination. Garner v. United
States, 424 U.S. 648 (1976). In such cases, the privilege
must be invoked to be applicable, although the Court has
been less willing to rely on a waiver theory for this
analysis. Id at 654 n.9.
' See Ritchie, supra note 3, at 385-86.
3 Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55
(1964).
a The Court has stated that: "The Framers addressed
the subject of personal privacy directly in the Fourth
Amendment.... They did not seek in still another
Amendment-the Fifth-to achieve a general protection
of privacy but to deal with the more specific issue of
compelled self-incrimination." Fisher v. United States,
425 U.S. 391, 400 (1976).
the Court, provides some support for the view that
the fifth amendment is an absolute barrier to state
imposed burdens on the right to remain silent.
Simply stated, any state action which "compels"
self-incrimination violates the privilege. The mean-
ingfulness of this approach, however, is tied to the
Court's conception of compulsion. Moreover, the
Court may feel constrained to read the requirement
narrowly in light of the fact that state actions so
classified would be totally barred. 9
In selected instances the Court has used absolut-
ist language to reject a burden imposed by the state
on the privilege against self-incrimination. Such
was the case in Griffin v. California,4° where the
Court held that the fifth amendment bars com-
ment upon a defendant's failure to testify. The
Court characterized comments upon a defendant's
trial silence and judicial acquiescence in those com-
ments as "a penalty imposed by courts for exercis-
ing a constitutional privilege" and objected to the
fact that it "cuts down on the privilege by making
its assertion costly."'1
The Court's decision in United States v. Jackson
42
similarly reflects a broad view of'judicial power to
reject unconstitutional compulsion.Jackson held the
capital punishment provision of the federal kid-
napping statute unenforceable because only the
jury could impose it, a sentencing structure which
served to deter assertion of the right to plead not
guilty and be tried by ajury. The Court noted that
"Congress cannot impose such a penalty in a man-
ner that needlessly penalizes the assertion of a
constitutional right."' 3 Like Griffin, the death pen-
3 In Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976), the
Court held that the fifth amendment was not offended
by a procedure in which prison disciplinary defendants
facing potential criminal charges suffered an adverse
inference in the prison proceeding if they exercised the
privilege against self-incrimination. In contrast, the dis-
sent put forward a persuasive argument that the com-
pulsion was "obvious." Id. at 333 (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing). The Court's narrow reading of compulsion may well
be partly out of a concern that the traditional use of
adverse inferences outside of the criminal trial not be
undercut, a result that might arguably have followed had
the inference been barred in the prison context. Id. at
319. See also Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970) (fifth
amendment no bar to pretrial notice of alibi defense).
40 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
41 at 614. Since then the Court has held that a no
adverse inference instruction given over the defendant's
objection does not constitute impermissible comment on
the defendant's failure to testify nor does it amount to
"compulsion" forbidden by the fifth amendment. Lake-
side v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333 (1978).
42 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
4 Id. at 583.
1979]
alty provision of the statute constituted an intol-
erable burden upon the exercise of the fifth amend-
ment."
The language in Griffin andjackson suggests that
the state may not penalize the assertion of fifth
amendment rights, but does not explain why such
penalties are barred. On the one hand, the penal-
ties might be so severe as to cause all information
obtained as a result of them to be considered
compelled; such would be the case if the state
presented an individual with the choice of reveal-
ing information or submitting to torture.45 But,
there are few penalties which so uniformly result
in the deprivation of free choice and the elimina-
tion of the ability to resist. Indeed, the Court's
unwillingness to invalidate guilty pleas secured
under the kidnapping statute prior to Jackson46 and
the numerous decisions refusing to overturn con-
victions despite improper prosecutorial comment,4 7
may indicate that the Court does not believe that
theJackson and Griffin penalties only produce "com-
pelled" admissions.
It is also possible to take the Court literally and
read Griffin and Jackson as barring the imposition
of any consequence whatsoever on the assertion of
the privilege against self-incrimination. Included
would be penalties which alone produce compul-
sion, as well as others, which may exert pressure in
favor of disclosure, but can be resisted. In effect,
such an approach would implicitly read the com-
" Of similar character was the Court's decision in
Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605 (1972). There, the
Court held the Tennessee rule requiring the defendant
to testify before his other witnesses to be a violation of
the fifth amendment. The Court felt the rule to be a
contradiction of the defendant's right "to remain silent
unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of
his own will, and to suffer no penalty... for such silence."
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964). Brooks, Jackson
and Griffin all reflect special concern for the defendant's
right to remain silent at his criminal trial. See Berger,
supra note 2, at 195-201.
"Torture would also constitute a due process viola-
tion. See e.g., Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 237-38
(1940). Mental coercion is also barred. See, e.g., Blackburn
v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206 (1960).
46Jackson did not hold all guilty pleas under the federal
kidnapping statute to be compelled; rather, it categorized
the structure as one in which guilty pleas were needlessly
encouraged. 390 U.S. at 583. In light of this, the Court
could subsequently uphold the constitutionality of pleas
accepted under the statute. Brady v. United States, 397
U.S. 742 (1970).47 The courts either hold such comments to be harmless
error or deem them cured by jury instructions. See, e.g.,
Lussier v. Gunter, 552 F.2d 385 (1st Cir. 1977); State v.
Sawicki, 173 Conn. 389, 377A.2d 1103 (1977); State v.
Lytle, 48 Ohio St.2d 391, 358 N.E.2d 623 (1976).
pulsion requirement of the fifth amendment as
encompassing a broad array of state tactics since it
is only compulsion to be a witness against oneself
that the privilege forbids. Seemingly, under this
view, any state actions that undercut an individ-
ual's pure and free choice to assert or forego the
privilege would be barred, and compulsion would
then control not only situations where the only real
choice available was self-incrimination, but also
those in which the alternatives were not equally
advantageous."
A position barring any consequence for the as-
sertion of fifth amendment rights is attractively
simple and seemingly offers unwavering protection
for the right to remain silent. Both befiefits may,
however, be more illusory than real. If the rule is
unyielding, it may well sacrifice important state
interests in its application, and to avoid such a
result the courts would undoubtedly find that what
appear to be penalties imposed on the right to
silence are really something else.
49
Beyond the potential deceptiveness of the theory
barring all state imposed consequences for assertion
of the privilege, it must also be stated that neither
history nor precedent support so expansive a read-
ing of the fifth amendment. The British origins 9 f
the privilege against self-incrimination are found
in cases of physical torture and administration of
the coercive oath ex officio,s° while the American
case law has focused upon abusive interrogation
techniques.51 Both traditions are far removed from
'8 The Court's statements in Griffin that the privilege
bars making its assertion "costly," 380 U.S. at'614, and
in Malloy that the decision to speak must be "unfettered"
and without penalty, 378 U.S. at 8, represent the most
supportive language for this view.
California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424 (1971), perhaps
best illustrates this problem. There, the Court upheld the
constitutionality of the California "hit and run" statute,
similar to those in force in all the states and the District
of Columbia. It is certainly arguable, as reflected in Mr.
Justice Harlan's concurrence, that a requirement that
drivers identify themselves after an accident is too im-
portant a state interest to sacrifice. Instead, the plurality
chose to treat the case as one in which the risk of self-
incrimination was insubstantial. Baxter v. Palmigiano,
425 U.S. 308 (1976), in which the Court refused to
consider the use of an adverse inference from silence in a
prison disciplinary hearing as an unconstitutional pen-
alty, is similar in character.
50 See generally sources cited supra note 5. The history
reflects primary concern for physical and legal compul-
sion.
51 See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966);
Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897). Before
incorporation of the fifth amendment and its application
to the states in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), the
issue was also treated as a due process requirement to
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the variety of lesser consequences that the invoca-
tion of the privilege may entail, and it does not
seem appropriate to place them all in the same
category. Severe penalties may negate free choice,
but minor sanctions necessarily do not. The com-
pulsion language of the privilege bars the state
from depriving its citizens of the ability to choose
between self-incrimination or silence, thereby plac-
ing them between the "rock and the whirlpool."5 2
Requiring individuals to make difficult decisions,
but not impossible ones, is not so clearly barred.m
It appears more likely that the burdens on the
fifth amendment found in Griffin and Jackson were
rejected for reasons unrelated to a concern for their
inherently compulsive character or a desire to pro-
claim a ban on any consequence for assertion of
the privilege. Exactly what characteristics of the
tenalties made them exceed constitutional bounds,
however, is left unclear." Instead, the Court used
language suggestive of theories that even further
analysis will not support. Perhaps the reason, as
Mr. Justice Harlan observed, is that due "in part
to the flagrant facts often before the Court" its
cases disclose that the language in many of the
opinions overstates the actual course of decision.ss
Yet, this does not help us to assess what conse-
quences the state may validly impose.
B. Barring Coerced Waivers
In another series of fifth amendment cases, the
Supreme Court was faced with a variety of state
penalties imposed upon individuals who refused to
waive the protection of the privilege against self-
incrimination. At issue were state statutes and
policies requiring officials or agents in the public
sector to respond to questions propounded in an
investigation of their activities. In addition, waivers
of the privilege were demanded. The uniform in-
validation of these tactics, however, conceals how
little real protection the Court is willing to afford
to those who wish to exercise their right to silence.
utilize only voluntary statements. See, e.g., Spano v. New
York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49
(1949).
52 Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S.
583, 593 (1926).
5 McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 213 (1971).
'The common feature of Griffin, Jackson and Brooks,
the focus upon the right to silence at trial, is not a
sufficient explanation of the decisions in light of Mc-
Gautha, where the burdening of the right by precluding
one who exercised it from addressing the sentencer on the
issue of punishment was upheld.
5 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 509-10 (19§6)
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
Garriy v. NewJersey was the first of the waiver-
penalty decisions. This 1967 case involved a New
Jersey probe into the alleged fixing of traffic tickets
by local police officers. The officers were ques-
tioned about their involvement after being warned
that their answers could be used against them in a
criminal proceeding and that state law subjected
them to removal from office for failure to respond
in such an inquiry. The questions were answered
and the answers were, in turn, used in a subsequent
criminal prosecution.
The opinion of the Court characterized the state-
ments obtained from the police as coerced and
therefore inadmissible.5 7 The reason was that the
"choice given petitioners was either to forfeit their
jobs or to incriminate themselves. The option to
lose their means of livelihood or to pay the penalty
of self-incrimination is the antithesis of free choice
to speak out or to remain silent. ' ' 8 Similarly, the
Court rejected the notion that the privilege had
been waived in light of the duress laden choice
facing the police officers.9
Obviously, the decision whether or not to exer-
cise the privilege against self-incrimination is made
more difficult when a consequence follows assertion
of the right. Whether or not the consequence has
as its purpose the encouragement of fifth amend-
ment waivers, it cannot avoid having such an
effect. This should not, in and of itself, result in
"compelled" self-incrimination unless the mere fact
that the choice of silence or self-incrimination-
made more difficult by the consequence-is suffi-
cient to constitute compulsion. In other words, a
decision such as Garril suggests that only a freely
made choice of self-incrimination is constitutional,
and the fact that the accused must weigh an ad-
ditional state imposed consequence in his decision
means that his choice can no longer be a free one.
Whereas Garrity was concerned with the admis-
sibility of statements obtained without a grant of
immunity and upon threat of dismissal, it did not
resolve the question of whether the state could
impose the consequence of dismissal if the individ-
ual being questioned chose to remain silent. Even
though Garri y established that such statements are
unconstitutionally compelled, barring their use in
a criminal prosecution solves the fifth amendment
problem and would presumably then authorize the
385 U.S. 493 (1967).
57 1d. at 497-98.
58Id. at 497.
9 "Where the choice is 'between the rock and the
whirlpool,' duress is inherent in deciding to 'waive' one
or the other." Id at 498.
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imposition of the consequence. Garriy is thereby
converted into an unofficial grant of immunity,
rather than serving as a barrier to the imposition
of sanctions for silence.
Spevack v. Klein,6° decided the same day as Garity,
presented the opportunity to review the imposition
of a Garrity -type sanction. The petitioner in Spevack
was disbarred for refusing to provide information
to a judicial inquiry after claiming the privilege
against self-incrimination. As a result of Garrity,
however, such statements are inadmissible. But in
rejecting the disbarment penalty, the Spevack Court
hinted that ultimate suppression is not sufficient to
satisfy the privilege.6' Not only is the state, there-
fore, precluded from utilizing the results of imper-
missible sanctions, but even the sanction itself may
not be imposed. By focusing upon the coerced
character of the statements obtained in Garrity and
the invalidity of pressure used to obtain such state-
ments in Spevack, the Court cast some doubt upon
the ability of the state to call upon its servants to
account for their conduct. Only Mr. Justice Fortas
in Spevack suggested that dismissal for failure to
respond in an official inquiry was proper as long as
there was no coerced waiver of the privilege against
self-incrimination.62 And, by 1968, with Mr. Justice
Fortas writing the majority opinions, 63 this became
the accepted doctrine.
64
The Court also clarified in its 1968 decisions the
role that immunity should play in judging the
validity of coercive state sanctions imposed upon
60 385 U.S. 511 (1967).
61 The petitioner in Spevack faced questioning with the
belief that his answers would be used against him. First,
when Spevack was questioned, Garriy had not yet been
decided; second, Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117 (1961),
had ruled the privilege unavailable in similar circum-
stances; third, a waiver of immunity was demanded.
Under these conditions, where Spevack had good reason
to believe he enjoyed no immunity, it would have been
unfair to uphold the penalty on the theory that suppres-
sion of the evidence was available. Nevertheless, the
Court made no mention of Garrity in its decision.
6 385 U.S. at 519 (Fortas, J., concurring in the judg-
ment).
6 Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass'n. v. Comm'r of
Sanitation, 392 U.S. 280 (1968); Gardner v. Broderick,
392 U.S. 273 (1968).
64 In Gardner, Mr. Justice Fortas wrote:
If appellant, a policeman, had refused to answer
questions specifically, directly, and narrowly relat-
ing to the performance of his official duties, without
being required to waive his immunity with respect
to the use of his answers or the fruits thereof in a
criminal prosecution of himself, ... the privilege
against self-incrimination would not have been a
bar to his dismissal.
392 U.S. at 278.
those who remain silent. It had been previously
established in Garriy that statements resulting from
coercive sanctions are inadmissible, thus effectively
conferring testimonial immunity. But, the existence
of immunity by operation of law, particularly
where the individual being questioned is not in-
formed of it or is led to believe there is no immu-
nity, did not save the sanctions.65 The position was
reaffirmed in the Court's 1973 decision in Lejkowitz
v. Turley.' The opinions seem to suggest that only
a refusal to respond after a formal grant of immu-
nity can justify imposing a sanction for such re-
fusal.
The Court's waiver-penalty decisions give no
real indication as to why the penalties were de-
clared invalid. The only similarity had been the
economic character of the penalties, including loss
of government employment, disbarment, and a
five-year ban from government contracts.6 Yet,
these economic sanctions are not necessarily equiv-
alent in their impact, although the Court believed
that a waiver obtained "under threat of loss of
contracts would have been no less compelled than
a direct request for the testimony without resort to
the waiver device. A waiver secured under threat
of substantial economic sanction cannot be termed
voluntary. ' 'ss
The Court, however, has not stopped its line of
decisions with "substantial economic sanctions."
The 1977 ruling in Lefkowitz v. Cunningham69 applied
the waiver-penalty principle to a political party
official called to testify before a grand jury about
his conduct in office. For refusing to waive the
privilege against self-incrimination, the official lost
his party positions and was barred from regaining
them or any other public office for five years. None
of the positions from which the official was re-
moved were salaried; therefore, a label of"substan-
tial economic sanction" could not have been ap-
plied to the state policy. Instead, the Court found
that removal from office was precluded because
6 The conditions present in Spevack, were not present
in Gardner. Nevertheless, the Court held that "the man-
date of the great privilege against self-incrimination does
not tolerate the attempt, regardless of its ultimate effec-
tiveness, to coerce a waiver of the immunity it confers on
penalty of the loss of employment." 392 U.S. at 279.
66414 U.S. 70, 80-81 (1973).
6 Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967), involved
disbarment. Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70 (1973),
concerned a ban on government contracting for five
years, and the remaining cases dealt with government
employees.
6 414 U.S. at 82-83.
69431 U.S. 801 (1977).
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the sanction was "potent" 70 and "inherently coer-
cive."'
'
It is difficult. to imagine that the grand jury
witness in Cunningham was "compelled" to incrimi-
nate himself in the same sense as the police officers
in Garrity. Indeed, the fact that Cunningham as-
serted his right to remain silent suggests that the
compulsion was far less effective. And, if the com-
pulsion is not "compelling," how is the fifth amend-
ment violated?
Perhaps the answer to this question lies in an-
other unifying thread in the Garrity line of decisions.
In each instance, the state penalty was concededly
dramatic and either imposed or threatened to im-
pose a consequence solely as a result of the invo-
cation of the privilege against self-incrimination.
The simple refusal to provide information without
a grant of immunity was the exclusive triggering
device. The Court may well have perceived this to
be an unfair imposition on the constitutional right
to remain silent. Rather than reaching a judgment
on the constitutionality of the sanction based ex-
clusively on the degree of compulsion it engenders,
the Court may also have been weighing the fairness
of imposing the sanction automatically upon asser-
tion of the privilege against self-incrimination.7
2
The implications of such an approach include the
possibility that sanctions which are not automati-
cally imposed, even if severe, may well survive
constitutional challenge. Such a result would un-
dercut much of the fifth amendment protection the
waiver-penalty principles appear to provide.
That the Court is willing to tolerate substantial
burdens on the privilege against self-incrimination
as long as they are not automatically triggered by
its assertion is demonstrated by the ruling in Baxter
v. Palmigiana.73 There, the Court considered a chal-
lenge by Rhode Island prison inmates to the con-
stitutionality of prison disciplinary procedures.
74
70Id. at 805.
7 Id. at 807. But see United States ex rel. Sanney v.
Montanye, 500 F.2d 411 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1027 (1974) (threat of loss of driver's assistant job held
for a few days held not sufficiently coercive).
72 See Ritchie, supra note 3, at 392-93.
7 425 U.S. 308 (1976). See generally Comment, Prison
Disciplinay Proceedings and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimi-
nation, 55 N.C.L. REv. 254 (1977).
7
4 The Court rejected special procedures for inmates
facing prison discipline and potential criminal prosecu-
tion including a right to counsel, 425 U.S. at 314-15, and
a right to a statement of reasons for and review of a
denial of cross-examination, Id. at 420-23. Instead, the
disciplinary procedures of Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S.
539 (1974), were reaffirmed. The Court refused to con-
Included in the practices attacked were the rules
applicable to prison disciplinary cases in which
inmates also faced potential criminal prosecution.
In such cases, inmates were warned of their right
to remain silent, but also informed that the disci-
plinary board would draw an adverse inference
from invocation of that right. The Court ofAppeals
had held that the fifth amendment barred an
adverse inference in such circumstances,' but the
Supreme Court disagreed and reversed.
Initially, the Palmigiano Court found no difficulty
in distinguishing Griffin v. Califomia76 which had
barred comment on the defendant's failure to tes-
tify in his criminal trial. Very simply, Griffin held
that no evidentiary use of silence can be made in
a criminal proceeding, and that is the limit of the
decision.7
The Garrity line of cases presented more of a
challenge and sparked a bitter dissent from Mr.
Justice Brennan. The Palmigiano Court majority
characterized the waiver-penalty decisions as situ-
ations "where refusal to submit to interrogation
and to waive the Fifth Amendment privilege,
standing alone and without regard to the other
evidence, resulted in loss of employment or oppor-
tunity to contract with the State. 7 8 In Palmigiano,
remaining silent did not automatically trigger
prison discipline; rather, the adverse inference it
generated "was given no more evidentiary value
than was warranted by the facts surrounding his'
case."79 Moreover, the Court suggested that the'
sider the application of due process safeguards to the loss
of rison privileges. 425 U.S. at 423-24.
F' The court below recognized that use of immunity
would resolve the fifth amendment problem. Palmigiano
v. Baxter, 510 F.2d 534 (Ist Cir. 1974).
76 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
7 Mr. Justice Brennan read Griffin as part of a series of
cases barring the imposition of penalties on the assertion
of fifth amendment rights, not as a special rule prohibit-
ing comment on a defendant's silence at trial. 425 U.S.
at 330-31 (Brennan, J., dissenting). There are hints else-
where, however, that the Court is interpreting Griffin
narrowly. In particular, the Court has held that the state
may not use a defendant's pretrial silence after a Miranda
warning for impeachment purposes. Doyle v. Ohio, 426
U.S. 610 (1976). But, its ruling was based on the due
process clause, not the fifth amendment. The dissenting
position, unchallenged by the majority, distinguished
Grifin as a case involving thie "prosecution's use of the
defendant's silence in its case-in-chief." Id at 628 (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting). Doyle reflects no suggestion of Griffin
as a general bar to fifth amendment penalties.
78425 U.S. at 318.
9 Id. See also Gastelum-Quinones v. Kennedy, 374 U.S.
469 (1963); Raffel v. United States, 271 U.S. 494 (1926);
Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149 (1923).
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fatal flaw in the Garrity line of cases was that the
individuals' "failure to respond to interrogation
was treated as a final admission of guilt,' '" a factor
which had been important in the due process
analysis of many of the 1950's loyalty oath cases.81
Mr. Justice Brennan's dissent rejected the fair-
ness theory of the majority in favor of a compulsion
analysis. He maintained that "the premise of the
Garrity-Le/kowitz line was not that compulsion re-
sulted from the automatic nature of the sanction,
but that a sanction was imposed that made costly
the exercise of the privilege.' ' 2 As a further quali-
fication, however, the dissent added that the bur-
den in Palmigiano was a sufficiently "substantial
sanction, 'm to justify invoking the waiver-penalty
theory.
Although Justice Brennan did not seek to define
the limits of his view of the waiver-penalty theory,
it is nevertheless clear that his analysis is more
protective of self-incrimination interests than the
majority's fairness rationale. The fairness theory,
much like the compulsion approach, will preclude,
allowing the assertion of the right to remain silent
to be the sole basis for invoking a penalty;U but it
will not stop the state from using the exercise of
the privilege as a factor contributing to the impo-
sition of a penalty. The majority may well have
been restricting the concept of compulsion to the
severe abuses which generated the privilege against
self-incrimination,s and thereby rewriting the
8o425 U.S. at 318.
81 In Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S.
551 (1956), modijfied, 351 U.S. 944 (1956) (per curiam),
the Court reversed the firing of a Brooklyn College
professor for invoking the fifth amendment to questions
relating to his Communist affiliations in a federal hear-
ing. The Court said that "we must condemn the practice
of imputing a sinister meaning to the exercise of a person's
constitutional right under the fifth amendment." 350
U.S. at 557. Implicitly, the Court was recognizing that
one of the interests that the privilege serves is to protect
the innocent. See generally E. GRISWOLD, THE FIFTH
AMENDMENT TODAY (1955). The Court, however, found
little difficulty in distinguishing Slochower and allowing
dismissals following invocation of the privilege where the
hearing was a local one, Beilan v. Board of Educ., 357
U.S. 399 (1958); where the reason was alleged to be
doubt as to reliability, Lerner v. Casey, 357 U.S. 468
(1958); insubordination, Nelson v. County of L.A., 362
U.S. 1 (1960); or obstruction of the investigation, In re
Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82 (1961); Konigsberg v. State Bar
of California, 366 U.S. 36 (1961).
82 425 U.S. at 331 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
83 Id. at 326.
84 This is demonstrated by the fact that the Court
invalidated automatic dismissal in Lefkowitz v. Cun-
ningham, 431 U.S. 801 (1977), decided after Palmigiano.
SSee notes 50-51, supra.
Garrity cases to fit its due process style analysis.
Compulsion, then, amounts to only that which
truly forces self-incrimination and other sanctions
which unfairly penalize the privilege by being
exclusively the result of its exercise. If so, it is a
theory which may permit very heavy pressure in-
deed on the decision to exercise or forego the right
to remain silent.
C. Balancing the Privilege
There is a middle ground between an absolutist
approach to evaluating burdens on the right to
remain silent and a theory which does no more
than bar the automatic imposition of certain sanc-
tions upon invocation of the privilege. Reflected in
several Supreme Court decisions,8 the alternative
involves a balancing of state and individual inter-
ests in assessing the permissibility of penalizing the
exercise of fifth amendment rights. Presumably,
not every penalty would be subjected to a balanc-
ing process of this sort. In particular, those penalties
truly coercive in the sense of compelling self-incrim-
ination would run afoul of the fifth amendment
regardless of thejustifying state interest. Resistable,
but harsh penalties, however, would be measured
by this standard.
Crampton v. Ohio8 presents the most extensive
treatment by the Court of a balancing theory of
the fifth amendment. There, the defendant Cramp-
ton was convicted of first degree murder in Ohio
and sentenced to death. Both the guilt determina-
tion and sentencing assessment were performed in
a single proceeding, a procedure which forces the
defendant to risk self-incrimination in order to
address the sentencer on the issue of punishment.
Unquestionably, the situation facing Crampton
required "the making of difficult judgments,"' but
the Court did not consider the pressure as amount-
ing to unconstitutional compulsion. As indicated
above, only inherently coercive consequences, per-
haps only those that are virtually irresistable, fit
within the traditional compulsion standard. This
leaves lesser burdens to be measured by a prbcess
86 See, e.g., California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424 (1971);
Crampton v. Ohio, 402 U.S. 183 (1971); Simmons v.
United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968). Crampton and its
companion case, McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183
(1971), both raised issues relating to jury sentencipg in
capital cases. Crarnpton, however, presented an additipnal
fifth amendment issue. References herein will be to
Crampton.
8402 U.S. 183 (1971).
88 McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 769 (1970),
cited in 402 U.S. at 213.
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of balancing which, for the Court, involved the
question of "whether compelling the election im-
pairs to an appreciable extent any of the policies
behind the rights involved." And, the Court uti-
lized only a single. page in concluding that fifth
amendment history and policy were not offended
by the unitary trial practice in capital cases.90
The only precedent creating difficulty for the
Court's theory was its decision in Simmons v. United
States.91 There, a criminal defendant had moved to
suppress critical government evidence. At the sup-
pression hearing, the defendant testified to his
possessory interest in the items seized in order to
establish standing, and these admissions were used
against him at trial after his motion to suppress
was denied. Finding it "intolerable that one con-
stitutional right should have to be surrendered in
order to assert another,"92 the Court held that
testimony in a fourth amendment suppression
hearing may not be used over objection to prove
guilt at trial. Where the choice is between two
constitutional rights, there is a "tension ' ' 3 created
which precludes use of the testimony at trial, de-
spite the fact that the testimony might be viewed
as voluntary in the traditional sense.9
Application of the Simmons constitutional tension
theory to the facts of Crampton poses something of
. problem. On one side of the balance is the right
to remain silent, but the other side reflects interests
that the Court was not willing to concede were of
constitutional magnitude, including the asserted
right to address the jury on the issue of punish-
ment.9 5 But, rather than debate the constitutional
character of the competing choices, the Court in-
stead disclaimed the constitutional tension theory
entirely in favor of a balancing analysis.
There are aspects of the balancing theory which
provide an attractive resolution to fifth amend-
ment burden problems. First, such an approach
avoids the potentially arbitrary application of an
absolute barrier theory. Since the fifth amendment
only bars compulsory self-incrimination, the Court
would have to stretch the concept of compulsion
dramatically to cover lesser burdens on the privi-
89402 U.S. at 213.
9
°Id at 214-15.
91390 U.S. 377 (1968).
92Id at 394.93 
d
94 Id. at 393-94.
95 402 U.S. at 217-18. The Court's more recent atten-
tiveness to the death penalty suggests that a bifurcated
trial might now be constitutionally required. Gardner v.
Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 VJ.S.
153 (1976).
lege, and no standards readily suggest themselves
for this task. Balancing also avoids the rather for-
malistic Palmigiano analysis in which the automatic
character of a penalty is rejected, but where the
severe sanctions of a non-mandatory character may
then survive challenge.
What balancing does not do, however, is ade-
quately protect fifth amendment rights.96 The
process appears to permit a superficial assessment
of the effect of the penalty on self-incrimination
interests. Beyond that, the balance will only be
judged after it is determined that such interests are
impaired "to an appreciable extent, ' 97 a status that
may be difficult to reach given the analysis the
Court undertook. And finally, apparently no sig-
nificance is attached to the absence of a state
interest behind the penalty.
A PRESUMPTIVE BARRIER THEORY
The Supreme Court's recent fifth amendment
decisions have restricted development of the privi-
lege against self-incrimination, and in some re-
spects have actually reversed precedent to cut back
upon traditional protections. 98 In light of the nar-
rowed scope into which the right to remain silent
has been compressed, and as a result of a compel-
ling need to protect those interests reflected in the
privilege against self-incrimination from an in-
creasingly intrusive society, whatever fifth amend-
ment coverage there is demands as much support
as society can tolerate.
Absolutely barring any consequence whatsoever
upon invocation of the privilege is seemingly the
most protective shield for fifth amendment inter-
ests. However, the rigidity of such an approach
invites skepticism as to its ultimate practicality.
Among the options available to undercut the the-
ory are artificial and natural impediments which
distinguish the privilege9 and refusals to classify
important state sanctions as consequences of re-
maining silent.10a And finally, there may well be
consequences of sufficient importance so as to jus-
tify requiring an election between them and the
' "[TJhis balancing inevitably results in the dilution
of constitutional guarantees." California v. Byers, 402
U.S. 424, 463 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting). Arguably,
balancing has resulted in the same dilution in fourth
amendment decisions. See United States v. Martinez-
Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Crampton v. Ohio, 402 U.S. 183, 213 (1971).
' Most directly undercut has been one of the classic
criminal procedure decisions, Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. 616 (1886).
' See Berger, supra note 2, at 199-201.
oo See note 39 supra.
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privilege against self-incrimination.' °' Without a
complete catalogue of all such consequences, a
decision in favor of an absolute barrier theory may
well be unjustified.
The waiver-penalty theory has similar deficien-
cies. As currently reflected in the Palmigiano and
Garrity line of decisions, its protective shield for fifth
amendment interests is illusory. As long as the
traditional lines of compulsion are not crossed and
automatic sanctions are not imposed for invocation
of the privilege, very severe pressures on the deci-
sion to exercise or forego the privilege will be
tolerated.
The balancing theory reflected in Crampton
would be more accurately characterized as a
weighted balance against the fifth amendment.
This is demonstrated by the threshhold level of
impairment required by the Court to invoke the
balancing process, and the limited analysis of priv-
ilege policies it was willing to undertake.1°2 The
approach is one readily adaptable for the purposes
of circumventing those interests that the privilege
against self-incrimination is designed to guard.
Despite the weaknesses of existing theories, it
remains possible to devise a sensitive accommoda-
tion between the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion and the interests encompassed in various kinds
of state consequences imposed on those who exer-
cise the right to remain silent. Given the limited
range of currently recognized self-incrimination
situations, the accommodation should reflect a pre-
sumptive barrier weighted against the sanction,
and demand a meaningful analysis of underlying
state and individual interests. Properly adminis-
tered, a presumptive barrier theory would insure
protection not only against traditional forms of
compulsion, which existing theories similarly guard
against, but also against less burdensome sanctions
which the alternatives do not effectively regulate.
The purpose of the state sanction should be the
initial consideration and also be of major signifi-
cance. As a matter of policy, those penalties which
are directed towards coercing testimony rather
than fulfilling other goals should not be enforced.1 3
It makes no sense to have a right to remain silent,
and yet permit the state to seek purposfully to
1o' See note 49 supra
'
0 2 See notes 89-90 supra.
3s In considering the federal kidnapping statute, for
example, the Court has noted that "[i]f the provision had
no other purpose or effect than to chill the assertion of
constitutional rights by penalizing those who choose to
exercise them, then it would be patently unconstitu-
tional." United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581
(1968).
circumvent it. The fact that we may allow the state
for other unrelated but significant reasons to im-
pose a consequence upon assertion of the privilege
in no way justifies permitting the state to use its
sanction for the purpose of securing testimony.
The preliminary requirement of a purpose un-
related to securing a waiver of the privilege will
undoubtedly create difficulties in its application.
By hypothesis, all of the state consequences that we
are concerned with will in some way burden the
decision whether or not to remain silent; absent
such an impact, no fifth amendment problems are
created. How, then, does one separate those con-
sequences whose impact on that decison is their
very purpose from those whose impact is simply a
side effect?
The assessment of purpose is not an unfamiliar
judicial role. Granting that the line is not and
cannot .be precise, the task nevertheless requires a
realistic weighing of the factors underlying the
sanction. How strongly does the state desire and
need the information sought for its purposes? Is the
state interest such that it would prefer the infor-
mation rather than having to impose the sanction?
The more these questions are answered in a way
that demonstrates a valid non-incriminatory use
for the information, the more reason there is to
allow the state interest to be entered into the
balance. 10
4
The Palmigiano factual circumstances provide an
excellent illustration of a suspicious state goal
which should not survive a purpose analysis. As
can be questioned from that case what function
does an adverse inference from silence at a prison
disciplinary hearing serve other than either to force
the inmate to talk without having to grant him
immunity or deter him from defending himself?
Allegedly, it would assist the trier of fact in resolv-
ing the question of whether a prison infraction
occurred," but by the Court's own admission an
automatic finding of guilt could not be based on
104 Hit and run statutes exemplify a strong interest in
the acquisition of information for non-criminal uses in-
cluding apportioning civil liability and reaching license
revocation decisions. California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424,
430-31 (1971). That should certainly save them from
automatic invalidation. But, the mere fact that the state
seeks both civil and criminal redress should not be deemed
a sufficient justification to override fifth amendment
interests. Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 808-
09 (1977).
,o5 Presumably, this is what the Court meant when it
stated that "silence was given no more evidentiary value
than was warranted." Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S.
308, 318 (1976). See generally Colloquium, Legislative Mo-
tivation, 15 SAN DiEGo L. REv. 925 (1978).
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the inmate's silence.1 6 Thus, since other evidence
of guilt is required, the adverse inference really is
not essential for determination of an infraction and
the purpose, even if not articulated by the state,
must be deemed to be impermissible.'0 7 Given a
presumption in favor of an unimpeded right to
remain silent, it is appropriately the state's burden
to demonstrate the justification behind its goal.
Once the validity of the state's goal is estab-
lished, the next inquiry must focus upon the avail-
ability of alternatives to achieve it. Such a require-
ment insures that there is no needless interference
with the privilege against self-incrimination. In
Crampton, for example, the defendant's decision
whether to testify on the issue of punishment was
burdened by the risk of self-incrimination that he
faced on the question of guilt. The simple alter-
native of a bifurcated trial would remove the bur-
den, and no persuasive reason to maintain the
unitary proceeding would exist.1 8 Consequently,
the state procedure would not survive constitu-
tional challenge.
Finally, assuming a state purpose not directed
towards the securing of incriminatory information
for criminal purposes and the absence of alterna-
tives to the particular state sanction, an analysis of
the individual and state interests would then be
undertaken. The Court's efforts at a balancing
approach thus far have been woefully deficient in
the interest analysis task,"° due undoubtedly to the
fact that the balance was weighted against the
right to silence. Shifting the burden ofjustification
to the state, in contrast, should call for a deeper
probe into what social values are promoted by the
fifth amendment. 10 Beyond that, the presumption
theory would have the further effect of demanding
an accounting from the state of what it is seeking
to accomplish and why.
The full presumptive barrier analysis, when ap-
plied to the waiver-penalty cases, would have pro-
duced the same result as the Court's rulings, but
106425 U.S. at 317.
" Mr. Justice Brennan complained that "it cannot be
denied that the disciplinary penalty was imposed to some
extent, if not solely, as a sanction for exercising the
constitutional privilege." 425 U.S. at 332 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
'08 While recognizing the recommendations in favor of
bifurcated trials, the Court did not feel a unitary pro-
ceeding offended the Constitution. Crampton v. Ohio,
402 U.S. 183, 221 (1971). The opinion does not suggest
a justification for the choice of the unitary trial.
"o See, e.g., Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318-
19 (1976); Crampton v. Ohio, 402 U.S. 183, 214-15
(1971).
"o See note 6 supra.
for different reasons. First, the "potent sanctions"
do not amount to traditional forms of compulsion
and thus could not be invalidated for that
reason."' The goals of the sanctions do reflect a
real state interest in requiring public officials to
account for their conduct in office,112 and therefore,
the sanctions do not run afoul of the purpose
inquiry. While there are alternatives for acquiring
the information, and these alternatives would have
to be pursued in a criminal context," 3 the state can
support its claim that its interest in insuring re-
sponsible public service, given the civil context of
the inquiry, need not require that the alternatives
be pursued.
That leaves the interest analysis, and it is here
that the state cannot meet its burden of overcoming
the presumptive barrier to penalizing the fifth
amendment. The state's interest in responsible
public service and an accounting from officials in
the public sector is concededly strong. But, its
efforts to secure these goals are undertaken in a
civil context which includes, most importantly, a
lower standard of proof. It is thus less in need of
information directly from the official involved that
may also be self-incriminatory. 1 4 Arrayed on the
other side of the equation are interests protected
by the privilege including forcing the state to make
its case without assistance from the accused, and
the right to a "private enclave"" - into which the
state may not intrude. Privacy of thought and
personality and fairness in the balance of power
between the state and the individual rest on one
side of the scale, while the public accounting goal
in its civil context rests on the other. Even if the
balance is not conceded to be in favor of the
privilege, the fact that the state must overcome a
presumption resolves the issue against the state
imposed sanction.
An illustration of a sanction that would survive
the presumptive barrier analysis is provided by the
Wisconsin legislation governing motor vehicle li-
cense revocations. The relevant statute provides for
"1 See notes 50-51 supra. Moreover, not all could be
classified as inherently coercive. See note 71 supra
"2 Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 278 (1968).
13The available alternatives include a grant of use
immunity and the utilization of other techniques of
investigation such as search and seizure and placement
of informants. These, however, are far more burdensome
and offer no guarantee of success as compared to the
alternatives of unitary or bifurcated trials in Crampton.
"" See, e.g., Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 432
n.6 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
11 Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of N.Y., 378 U.S.
52, 55 (1964).
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an automatic one-year revocation of the driver's
license of one who fails to "stop and render aid
... in the event of a motor vehicle accident result-
ing in the death of or personal injury to another or
in serious property damage.9 116 The statutory pur-
pose of rendering assistance is an obviously valid
one and there are no equivalent alternatives. More-
over, there is no demand for the provision of further
incriminatory information and, unlike the hit-and-
run statute considered by the Supreme Court,"
17
the consequence is a civil license revocation rather
than a criminal penalty. In balance, the state's
interest in insuring that accident victims receive
aid, backed up by a threatened civil sanction,
outweighs the individual interest in avoiding the
potential incrimination which might arise from
complying with the statute.
It may well appear that a presumptive barrier
theory will allow the state little room to penalize
an individual's exercise of the privilege against self-
incrimination. Given the narrowed scope of the
fifth amendment, however, that is as it should be.
Rather, the theory and its application insures max-
imum protection for the right to remain silent
where the right still exists, while leaving enough
room for those special state interests that may
outweigh the privilege. Only traditional forms of
compulsion would be barred without any attempt
at balancing. No further protection for the state is
warranted, and hopefully very few such state goals
will be deemed to satisfy the standard.
CONCLUSION
The difficulty that the Court has had in devel-
oping a standard to govern the imposition of sanc-
tions for the exercise of the privilege against self-
incrimination is partly a reflection of its uncer-
tainty as to the proper role the right to silence
should have in our system of justice. There is a
continuum of pressure tactics that the state can
employ to coerce information, and regulating the
continuum requires that fundamental policy deci-
sions be made on the relative scope of state power
and individual freedom. In undertaking such a
task only some of thejudgments, those which reflect
the extremes of the continuum, can be made with-
out provoking substantial dissension. The resolu-
tion of other conflicts, particularly those in the
middle of the range of state coercive tactics, is far
more difficult. And, even if the Court has been
forced to resolve specific cases of this sort, it has
116 Wis. STAT. ANN. § 343.31(1)(d) (West 1971).
"7 California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424 (1971).
understandably sought to avoid framing a stan-
dard which would force it to answer basic alloca-
tion of power questions at the same time.
If one concentrates upon the most recent of the
Supreme Court's fifth amendment cases, it is ap-
parent that the Court is losing some of its ambiv-
alence towards the right to remain silent. Uncer-
tainty, however, has given way to restrictiveness in
virtually every setting in which fifth amendment
issues arise."8 The result is a narrowed scope for
the right to remain silent, but that is an outcome
that need not bring along with it greater leeway
for the state to coerce self-incrimination within the
privilege's new scope limits.
The theories the Court has used to regulate state
imposed burdens on the fifth amendment reflect
alternating protectionism for and indifference to
the privilege against self-incrimination. The
Court's most recent narrowing of the scope limits
of the right to silence, however, has carried over
into its regulation of burdens imposed on the ex-
ercise of that right. The Court's disaffection for the
privilege against self-incrimination is indicated by
its willingness to recognize the right in only a
narrowed set of circumstances and to approach the
imposition of consequences on the exercise of the
right in a formalistic manner."19
If the privilege against self-incrimination does
not encompass important interests deserving of
protection, there need be no particular concern
over the Court's indifference to it. The character of
the privilege decisions suggests that with the exclu-
sion of the overt forms of compulsion from which
the privilege historically emanated, the Court does
not see enough value in the privilege to deviate
from traditional limits. The Court has willingly
halted the use of force in the extraction of infor-
mation;120 the fact that a range of privacy results
is treated as merely an incidental side effect rather
than as an independent value protected by the
privilege.
121
With this framework, the Court's indifference to
state pressures on the privilege becomes more un-
derstandable. The burdens permitted by the cur-
rent doctrine are, from the Court's perspective,
12sSee, e.g., Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463
(1976); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
"9 Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976); Califor-
nia v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424 (1971).
12D Included in the prohibition is the inherent compul-
sion of police custodial interrogation, Miranda v. Ari-
zona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).




neither unfairly imposed nor likely to compel self-
incrimination in the traditional sense. The fact
that our "private enclave" may dissipate is simply
not relevant since fifth amendment privacy protec-
tion is only an afterthought.' 2
By contrast, a presumptive barrier theory to
regulate fifth amendment burdens gives privacy
protection a central role in the privilege against
self-incrimination. It takes as its cue precedent
which the current Court rejects.sn And, if it accu-
rately reflects the importance of privacy in the
right to remain silent, it is a vastly superior theory
as against the Court's alternatives to protecting
core fifth amendment values. Moreover, it protects
'n2The narrow approach of the Court to the fifth
amendment stands in marked contrast to recent fourth
amendment analysis. Thus, while the fifth amendment is
tied to its history, the Court has recognized that search
and seizure abuses which were not a serious concern to
the framers ari still controlled by the fourth amendment.
No compelling logic for the inconsistency readily suggests
itself. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
1n Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) (fifth
amendment prevents the compelled production of private
documents).
an interest which has an increasing need for such
protection in a more crowded and intrusive society
than that which originally spawned the privilege.
What the presumptive barrier theory does not
do, however, is create an absolute barrier. And, in
not doing so, there is the risk that the leeway given
for state regulation will be improperly expanded.
But, by the same token, even an absolute barrier
theory could be manipulated to achieve the same
ends. Assuming conscientious interpretation, how-
ever, the presumptive barrier theory is no more
than an admission that we do not have a complete
catalogue of all existing and potential fifth amend-
ment consequences. In the absence of such a cata-
logue, we should be reluctant to reject categorically
the possibility of any consequence being imposed
following exercise of the privilege. If there is a
recognition of what the privilege achieves for soci-
ety, the risk that the presumptive barrier theory
will permit unwarranted infringements is minimal.
In the final analysis, the theory represents a reason-
able accommodation of individual and state inter-
ests upon which the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation can operate.
